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PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL QUESTIONS 
Respondent's answering brief is so at variance 
on the facts and inferences of fact and so non-
responsive to part of the issues, that plaintiff re-
gards a reply brief as desirable to sharpen the issues 
m this case. 
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Appellant regards the following as the ques-
tions to be decided: 
1. Did Mickelson act as a franchised distrib-
utor for Gindy Manufacturing Co. (herein called 
Gindy) or was Freeway Trailer Sales, Inc. (herein 
called Freeway) at all times the soliciting agent of 
Gindy in securing and forwarding orders from pro-
spective purchasers for Gindy trailers? 
2. As regards plaintiff, is defendant estopped 
to say that Freeway did not earn commissions on 
the Milne and 1st interstate orders which after Sep-
tember 22, 1962 turned out to be fictitious and which 
were on that date innocently misrepresented to plain-
tiff as true orders to induce definite and substantial 
action on its part. 
3. Did Freeway under the applicable law of 
agency earn commissions on the Morrison and Pee-
bles orders? 
4. Does defendant's telegram of September 
22, 1962 to plaintiff, in light of its wording and the 
material surrounding circumstances, create an ac-
tion of promissory equitable estoppel against defend· 
ant as an "Informal contract without assent or con· 
sideration" as spelled out in Section 90 of the Re· 
statement of contracts and the judicial interpreta· 
tion of that Section, or is it only an acknowledge· 
ment of an assignment of commissions to be earned! 
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VITAL DISAGREEMENTS ON FACTS AND 
INFERENCES OF FACT 
The first disagreement on the facts is as to the 
relation among Gindy, Freeway and Mickelson. De-
fendant's brief, page 18, side-steps the facts which 
estahlish the legal relation of these parties. It states: 
On September 28, 1962, G. H. Mickelson 
was a franchised distributor or dealer of trail-
ers manufactured by Gindy - pursuant to 
a written agreement executed March 1, 1962. 
Plaintiff refers to the facts stated in its origi-
nal brief, pages 9 to 11 inclusive, which show con-
clusively the facts to be, that Mickelson never pur-
chased and resold even one, single trailer, which 
by legal definitions is the established meaning of the 
phrase "franchised distributor or dealer." The facts 
are that on September 22, 1962 and ever since March 
1, 1962, Freeway, a Utah, Mickelson-dominated cor-
poration was in fact and law by the undisputed doc-
umentary and oral evidence the soliciting agent of 
Gindy. 
Freeway had earlier advertised in the yellow 
pages of the telephone directory as Gindy's repre-
sentative ( R. 30). Freeway had solicited for, secured 
and sent to Gindy the eight orders and so-called 
orders for trailers listed on page 21 of plaintiff's 
original brief. The assignment of commissions to 
plaintiff was from Freeway (Ex. 5) . 
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Defendant's telegram ref erred to orders from 
Freeway and/ or Mickelson (Ex. 1). The loan by 
plaintiff of $12,000 induced by reliance on Gindy's 
telegram was made to Freeway (Ex. 4). Mickelson 
testified that the agreement of March 1, 1962 was 
intended to be an agreement between Gindy and 
Freeway (R. 87). 
Mr. Walters, Treasurer of Gindy, expressly re-
jected the idea that Mickelson ever acted as "a fran-
chised distributor or dealer of Gindy trailers." 
Mickelson had a concession from us in mid-
August. The billing on this would be handled 
by him. We billed and then the invoice went 
unpaid for a substantial time. We contacted 
Milne truck to determine why and he denied 
he had the trailer or even ordered it (R. 128). 
Q. When did you become aware of .. 
Mickelson's financial difficulties, Mr. Wal-
ters? ... 
A. Well, it was common knowledge Mick· 
elson had financial problems as long as I re· 
member (R. 121). 
Q. Under your agreement with Mr. Mick· 
elson he was to receive payment for these 
trailers and then pay independently for them. 
wasn't he? ... 
THE WITNESS: No (R. 122). 
There is no evidence in this case which would 
t 'ty of call for a conclusion that the corporate en I 
Freeway shall be disregarded according to the fac· 
d 
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A. That was the facts - exactly as they 
were understood. (Italics for emphasis.) 
Respondent studiously avoids mentioning the 
six factors which fulfill the requirements of an ac-
tion of promissory equitable estoppel as outlined by 
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th ed., 1941, Vol. 
3, Section 805. (See plaintiff's original brief pp. 
6-7.) It is understandable why this is so. The very 
first factor as a basis of an action is that, 
1. There must be conduct - acts, lan-
guage, or silence - amounting to a represen-
tation or concealment of a material fact. (Ital-
ics supplied for emphasis.) 
It is the representation relied upon, and acted 
upon, in a definite and substantial manner by the 
representee which determines the scope and ambit 
of the promise. It is reliance and substantial action 
in reliance on that representation which causes the 
law to invoke estoppel against the representor and 
which will not allow it to deny the particular repre-
sentation on which the actor relied - otherwise in-
justice to the relying actor would result. 
POINT III 
WHILE THE OLD RULE WAS THAT REP-
RESENTATIONS AND PROMISES AS TO THE 
FUTURE DO NOT ORDINARILY CREATE AN 
ESTOPPEL THE PRESENT RULE WHICH AC-
CELERATED AS AN EXCEPTION UNDER THE 
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REPEATED APPLICATION OF SECTION 90 OF 
THE RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS NOW 
IS THE GOVERNING RULE IN SUCH CASES 
WHEN ACTION OF DEFINITE AND SUBSTAN-
TIAL CHARACTER IS INDUCED THEREBY. 
The following statement of law is made in 31 
C. J. S., Section 80 at pages 289-290: 
"Notwithstanding the unaminity of the 
courts with respect to - the statement of the 
general rule" (p. 290) that "ordinarily a rep-
resentation as to the future or a promise can-
not create an estoppel" ( p. 289) "representa-
tions to the future or promises have been 
enforced or permitted to operate as an equit- , 
able estoppel if to do otherwise would perpe-
trate a fraud or cause injustice in a case where 
the representation or promise" (or both to-
gether) "has been made to induce action and 
has in fact induced action on the part of thr 
party setting up the estoppel. This exception 
has come to be known as the doctrine of prom-
issory estoppel: In such cases it is held that 
the party making the promise" (or represen-
tation and integrated promise) "is estopped 
to assert the lack of consideration therefor." 
(pp. 290-291) (Italics added for emphasis and 
applicability to the instant case.) 
The 1963 Cumulative Supplement to 31 C. J. S., 
Section 80 cites 93 cases decided in 17 states and the 
United States Courts which approve the so-calle.d 
exception to the old general rule. See accord: Ame;·1• 
can Jurisprudence, Estoppel, Sections 52 and o3. 
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A CASE IN POINTS 
A leading case in point is People's National 
Bank v. Lynebarger Construction Co. ( 1951) 219 
Ark. 11, 240 S. W. 2d 12, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1086. 
The defendant contractor importuned the bank 
to make weekly advances of funds to a subcontractor 
for the meeting of payrolls. The bank was to take 
assignments of payments due and to come due from 
the contractor to the subcontractor. The bank made 
the advances on representations of the contractor 
of periodic estimates of amounts to become payable 
to the subcontractor in the next pay period. On Au-
gust 12th the contractor represented that $16,000.00 
would become due on the following September 15th 
one month and four days later. The subcontractor 
became bankrupt in the meantime and did not finish 
the job. 
The contractor had overestimated the amount 
to be paid on the contract, a fact discovered later to 
be overestimated by a sum of $11,996.07. Upon ac-
tion, the bank was allowed recovery of the amount 
advanced, namely $11,996.07 on strength of the rep-
resentation of the contractor as to a future prob-
ability which turned out to be an innocent, but false 
l'epresentation, if future occurrences could be proved 
by the contractor. Estoppel prevented such proof. 
The governing rule is stated by the Arkansas 
Court as follows : 
He who by his language or conduct leads 
another to do what he would not otherwise 
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have done, shall not subject such person to 
loss or injury by disappointing expectations 
on which he relied. 
The rule as stated by the Arkansas Supreme , 
Court is pertinently applied to the varying fact situ. 
ations in the 93 cases cited in the 1963 Suppliment 
to 31 C. J. S., Sec. 80. It should be applied in this 
case. 
Williston & Thompson, Contracts, 1938 ed., Sec. 
1508 indicate that today the defendant would be 
estopped in a Derry v. Peek case 14 A. C. 337. 
The Oregon Supreme Court in applying the 
fraud-preventing doctrine usually called promissory ! 
estoppel - sometimes called simply equitable estop-
pel - in the case of Schafer v. Fraser ( 1955) 206 
Or. 446, 290 P. 2d 190, 48 A. L. R. 2d 1087 adopts 
a highly descriptive phrase from tort law. Instead ' 
of using the customary terminology of the reprt-
sentator-promissor's intent that his language should, 
or expectation that his language would, induce the 
contemplated kind of conduct, the court uses the tort 
test for this factual requirement, namely, that of 
"forseeability by the representator-promissor as a 
reasonable man" that his language will induce "con· 
duct of the kind which occurred." 
Respondent argues that Gindy "did not repre-
sent that the 'orders in or pending' would in fact 
materialize into sales or earned commissions." (Re-
spondent's brief, p. 9.) 
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If we were dealing only with a law action of 
deceit requiring scienter concurrent with the repre-
sentation that would be true. But the fraud or in-
justice spoken of in promissory equitable estoppel 
is not concerned with scienter. It is concerned with 
the fraud or injustice which will occur to the plain-
tiff if the defendant is not estopped to say that the 
orders which he represented would easily produce 
$17,000 of commissions have not produced (for this 
case) $9,500. 00. 
Respondent's argument as to the futuro nature 
of the representation assumes that we are not dis-
cussing whether the facts of this case are one in 
which equitable estoppel should be applied against 
defendant to prevent injury to the plaintiff. Certain-
ly respondent will be forced to admit that if the court 
in looking for the six requirements for invoking the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel and finds them, then 
defendant will be estopped to say, that its represen-
tation that it had on hand "orders in or pending" "to 
more than cover this" ( $17 ,000) "did not material-
ize into sales or commissions." 
We respectfully submit that the factual require-
ments of promissory, equitable estoppel as outlined 
on pages 6 and 7 of plaintiff's original brief are 
fully made out and that relief should be granted to 
plaintiff as prayed in its original brief in this case. 
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